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Abstract
We compare the effect of legal and institutional competition for the
design of labor institutions in an environment characterized by holdup
problems in human and physical capital. We compare autarky with
the two country case, assuming that capital is perfectly mobile and
labor immobile. We distinguish two cases. In the first, the political
system is free from capture, while in the second, we examine the case
where labor captures the institutional design problem. We find that
in the former case, a competition of systems reduces welfare while in
the latter it improves the overall outcome.
1 Introduction
Globalization has led to an accrued interest in the relationship between the
legal and institutional design of societies and their respective economic per-
formance (e.g. Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer
(2004), and Caballero, Covan, Engel and Micco (2004), World Bank Doing
Business Report (2006)). In this paper, we focus on the design of the legal
and institutional framework governing labor relationships and we analyze the
impact of globalization thereon.
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The last decades have been marked by great improvements in the theory
of the firm. After a slow start to Coase’s (1937) seminal paper on the nature
of the firm, we have witnessed in the literature of thirty years a plethora
of theoretical contributions discussing and explaining the boundary of the
firm and its internal organization. Recent articles by Garrouste and Saussier
(2005) and Gibbons (2005) in a conference volume published by the Jour-
nal of Economic Behavior & Organization summarized some of the main
currents in that development. Elemental arguments for the existence and
organization of firms refer to theories based on asymmetric information (and
the need of incentive systems), the existence of transaction costs, the reality
of incomplete contracts and opportunistic behavior, the ensuing importance
of delegation problems, and the allocation of property rights.
Though many theoretical contributions in the theory of the firm ignore
(or take for granted) the underlying legal and institutional framework, au-
thors are well aware of its importance. For example, incentive contracts
may need interpretation by judges to implement them. Alternatively, in the
case of incomplete contracts, negotiation over appropriable quasi-rents will
be affected by the parties’ respective bargaining power. The latter should be
influenced by the legal and institutional setup, by courts behavior, and by
societal norms. An example that has been developed in the recent literature
concerns the rules and regulations guiding corporate governance to address
the risk of investor’s expropriation (see e.g. Rajan and Zingales (1998) and
the literature therein).
The legal and institutional environment influence the underlying trade-
offs which theorists have found to justify the existence of the firm, its bound-
ary and its internal organization. Consequently, legal and institutional frame-
work indirectly affects the functioning and the efficiency of the firm and, by
aggregation, of the entire economy. This raises a normative question as to
how that setup should be designed. The question becomes all the more urgent
with economic development and the exponential growth in international trade
for goods and services over the last fifty years. In this increasingly global-
ized world, we are witnessing an enhanced competition between institutional
systems, in particular, between legal orders. More recently, we observe grass
root movements advocating against the globalization. They argue that the
process not only generates (winners and) losers, but more importantly that it
reduces the ability of national states to design institutions addressing market
failures.
In this paper, we use a simple model to address some of these issues.
We consider an environment characterized by incomplete contracts leading
to multiple holdup problems. The legal and institutional framework is then
designed to mitigate the ensuing inefficiencies. With respect to the pol-
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icy variables, what we have in mind are employment laws (regulating dis-
missal procedures and employment conditions), collective relation laws (co-
determination, conflict resolution mechanisms), social security laws as well as
institutions that implement these laws.1 In the model, we abstract from the
specifics of these laws and their implementation. Instead, we capture the sum
of all these different effects by one single variable, specifically, the bargaining
power of labor in a Nash bargaining context. In practice, there are many ways
in which the legal and institutional environment shapes the abilities of par-
ties to appropriate fractions of the quasi rents. For example, it is well known
that increasing the workers outside opportunity (for instance raising welfare
payments) has the same effect as raising the bargaining power of workers in
a Nash bargaining context.2 Another example concerns the freedom of in-
corporations. According to this, companies incorporated in one state have
the right to operate in any other and states compete for companies to incor-
porate in their jurisdictions. Recent judgements of the European Court of
Justice have reaffirmed the principle of freedom of establishment in EU.3 An
obvious immediate effect is a decreasing in the bargaining power of workers.
Further examples include direct changes in labor laws. For instance, in the
German reform package “Agenda 2010” law have increased the possibility for
one firm to lend workers to other firm (the key issue is that it undermines
wage agreements between a firm and a union, thereby, decreases bargaining
power of workers). Other examples include variations in severance package,
the propensity of courts to directly allocate a fraction of the rent resulting
from specific investments in case of a layoff etc...4
In the model, we contrast two possibilities. First, we consider a closed
economy and assume that the political process selects bargaining power to
maximize society’s total welfare. Thus, we initially ignore distortions in the
political process resulting from lobbying or other influence activities.5 In the
environment analyzed, the welfare maximizing bargaining power balances
the negative effects of a misallocation of capital between firms against an
under-investment in specific human capital by the worker. Next, we exam-
ine the impact of institutional competition between two identical states on
the design process assuming that capital is perfectly mobile while labor is
1See Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2004) for an extended
list of policy measures (Table I). About the effect of change in employment law and the
importance of courts to complete contracts see also Macleod and Nakavachara (2006).
2See, Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986) together with Rubinstein (1982).
3See, Fluck and Mayer (2005) for an analysis.
4See, Macleod and Nakavachara (2006), and Gabuthy and Muthoo (2005).
5For a similar approach and a thorough discussion of the assumption, see Sinn (2003,
p. 9).
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immobile. In the non-cooperative equilibrium, we find that each country
distorts its institutional design, increasing the bargaining power of producers
in an attempt to attract foreign capital. Due to the symmetry assumption,
neither country can succeed in their endeavor. In the Nash equilibrium each
country uses its own capital only. However, the institutional design has been
distorted, thus, lowering the overall welfare.
The foregoing heuristic illustrates the costs associated with the systems
competition; it traps the institutional design stage in a prisoners’ dilemma
game. In the above model, it increases the inefficiencies providing an ar-
gument against systems competition. We conclude with a cautionary note
using a second best argument. We apply the same framework to solve for
an alternative example where the political process itself is initially distorted
through lobbying activities. Considering rent seeking activities, we derive the
institutional structure which would emerge if the institutional design process
is captured by one party. Specifically, we consider the case where labor rep-
resentatives have managed to capture the institutional design stage to the
advantage of workers. Not surprisingly, in autarky the resulting allocation of
bargaining power is skewed in favor of labor lowering overall welfare. Em-
bedding the model in a two countries environment, we find, just as before,
that the prisoners’ dilemma game generates incentive to reduce the bargain-
ing power of labor. However, this time it is welfare enhancing because the
bargaining power of labor was initially excessive. The example illustrates the
well known result, that in an initially inefficient environment, a distortionary
policy may become welfare enhancing. We could have derived a similar con-
clusion for a capture by the factor capital. The formalization is more elab-
orate, however, because it requires distinguishing for labor supply between
skilled and unskilled labor. Not withstanding the additional complexity, the
basic intuition would remain the same.
Our paper belongs to a class of so called Tiebout models (Tiebout, 1956).
Unlike the standard approach in that literature, we are not interested in
the effect of interstate competition on the supply of public goods financed
through taxation. Rather we are looking at the supply of legal and institu-
tional environment designed to reduce the organizational costs of firms. We
focus here on organizational costs induced by holdup problems in the firm.
The traditional approach of institutions considers that market failures ex-
plain the nature and the form of organizational arrangements (Coase (1960),
Demsetz (1967), and North and Thomas (1971)). We can observe that the
legal and institutional setup could further reduce transaction costs and inef-
ficiencies (which implies to consider also the risk of capture by rent seekers).
The paper is also related to the current debate on the effect of systems com-
petition. The conclusions of that literature are contrasted. Some authors,
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in the tradition of Hayek and Schumpeter, advocate systems competition as
a mean to induce efficiency (e.g. Mahoney (2001), Ogus (2003)). Others
disagree claiming that it would lead to a “race to the bottom”. For example,
in the case of taxation, Mintz and Tulkens (1986) and Wildasin (1988) find
that the Nash equilibrium in jurisdictional competition is generally non opti-
mal. A similar result is shown by Romano (2005) in the case of competition
concerning corporate charters or by Fluck and Mayer (2005) for corporate
governance, freedom of reincorporation and competition law. For criminal
law, Marceau and Mongrain (2004) show how competition between jurisdic-
tions in crime protection can lead to over-deterrence. A recent book by Sinn
(2003) summarizes the main argument against systems competition arguing
that it amounts to a reintroduction of the market by the back door. Apply-
ing the heuristic to the institutional design, his main argument would be
that in a well functioning democracy the legal framework should have been
structured to counter market failures. In such a setup, introducing systems
competition would reintroduce the failures that originally caused the govern-
ment to take action and that the failures would show up again at the higher
level of government competition.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In section (2.), we
present the model. The specificity of the model is that it leads to holdup
problems because the respective parties must invest before they agree to a
specific labor contract. In section (3.), we identify the first-best solution.
Next, we derive in (4.) the parties investment decisions and solve the regu-
lator problem in autarky. In section (5.), we consider the result of systems
competition with no capture of the political process. Following, we analyze
the effects of capture by labor in (6.) Finally, section (7.) offers some con-
cluding remarks.
2 The model
We consider a static environment with two identical countries. In each coun-
try, the economy is made up of a regulator, two sectors and an initial capital
stock K. In each sector, there is one representative firm. Even though the
number of players is small, we assume competitive behavior.6 Physical capi-
tal is assumed to be a productive input that cannot be directly consumed.
The two representative sectors stand for two different technologies in the
production of a single consumption good. In sector 1, the technology is
6The requirement is not very restrictive since we could easily introduce a large number
of identical players.
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assumed to employ capital only.7 For the representative firm in that sector,
production is given by g(k1) = λk
γ
1 , with λ > 0 and 0 < γ < 1/2.
8 In
the second sector, the representative firm owns a production technology that
requires capital and one unit of labor. Labor can increase productivity by
investing in human capital. We denote by f(k2, h2) the production function




2, with φ > 0 and 0 < δ · 1/2. The
parameters φ and λ are useful to discuss the effects of varying the significance
of human capital and the relative importance of the two sectors.
The separability condition is an important restriction not allowing us to
study the impact of complementarity between the factors of production on
the allocation of bargaining power. However, for the purpose of analyzing
the effect of legal and institutional competition, the reduction of complexity
allows us to more easily isolate the effect of changes in the institutional setup.
The capital market is taken to be perfectly competitive. Firms can acquire
physical capital at the rental rate r. From the point of view of the worker,
acquiring human capital is costly. Without loss of generality, we measure the
costs of human capital by h, i.e. we represent human capital in terms of its
acquisition costs.
We assume that the parties must invest before they meet. After the
firm and the worker have invested, they are matched up. Once matched the
parties’ outside opportunity is taken to be zero. We follow the recent labor
literature by assuming that firms cannot make take-it-or-leave-it offers and
that the parties must, instead, negotiate the division of the quasi-surplus.9
Consequently, each side faces a holdup problem in their respective investment
decision. We assume that the outcome of the negotiations can be represented
as the outcome of a Nash bargaining game where α denotes the bargaining
power of labor.10 As discussed in the introduction, we interpret α as reflecting
the legal and institutional framework which is exogenous at the bargaining
stage.
The exact timing of the game is as follows. In the first step, the political
process determines α. For this stage, we distinguish four possible scenari;
autarky with and without rent seeking activities, and trade between two
identical countries again with and without predatory behavior. In the case
7Intuitively, this sector stands for markets where the assumption regarding perfect
competition are nearly satisfied and there are no holdup problems.
8The parametric restriction is important to guarantee that the second order condition
is satisfied.
9See Grossman and Hart (1986), Pissarides (2000) and the literature therein.
10The Nash bargaining solution comes from the cooperative game theory. However, it is
well known that its use can be justified using non-cooperative bargaining à la Rubinstein
(Rubinstein (1982) and Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986)).
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of trade, we assume that capital is perfectly mobile while labor is immobile.11
In order to analyze the effect of legal and institutional competition, we only
consider situations where the countries do not cooperate to determine α.
Instead, we assume that they play simultaneously. In the second stage, the
firms and the worker invest in physical and human capital respectively. In
the third step, the firm in sector 2 is matched with the worker and the two
parties bargain over the division of the quasi-surplus. Finally, production
takes place, the factors are paid and consumption occurs.
3 The first-best solution
We start with the benchmark case where there are no market imperfections.
In that case, there is no need of adjusting the institutional design allocating
bargaining power between the parties since the economy would attain the




















In this section, we consider the case of a single country with no trade. We
apply backward induction. We start with the individual economic agents
assuming that the institutional design problem has been resolved and the
bargaining power has already been allocated between the parties. Next, we
consider the resulting market equilibrium. Given that we are in a one good
economy and that only the representative firm in sector 2 uses labor, the only
relevant market determines the allocation of capital between the two sectors.
Finally, we consider the institutional design problem assuming that society
anticipates the impact of her decision on welfare.
11The result of the analysis would extend to situations where labor is also mobile, but
its mobility is more costly than that of capital.
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4.1 The parties investment decisions under holdup
We first consider the firm in sector 1. Its decision problem is simply to select













The investment decision of the second firm and the worker’s problem are
jointly determined as the outcome of a prisoners’ dilemma game. Using
backward induction, we start at the bargaining stage. At this point in time,
the parties that are matched have already invested in h2 and k2. The nego-
tiation between the parties solely involves the division of the quasi-surplus
f(k2, h2). At that point in time the investment costs of both parties are sunk.
Since we have assumed that the outcome of negotiation can be represented
by the solution of a Nash bargaining problem, the worker’s wage, s, is the




1−α [s]α . (4)
From the first order condition, we obtain the parties’ respective shares of the
quasi-rent. It is easily verified that the firm receives (1− α) f(k2, h2) and the
worker obtains αf(k2, h2).13
Going one step back in the game, the parties decide on their respective
investment choices anticipating the outcome of the wage negotiation. Thus,
the worker will decide his level of human capital by solving
max
h2
αf(k2, h2)− h2 , (5)




12Whenever possible without confusion, we will drop the subscript referring to the sector.
13We do not consider here the possibility that the worker obtains the profit of the firm
that he works for. Otherwise, the worker is obviously not a worker in the classical sense.
An obvious setup is to implicitly assume a “replica” economy where the worker owns
fractions of other firms.
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Similarly, the firm will solve
max
k2
(1− α) f(k2, h2)− rk2 , (7)









The respective decision rules reflect the regulator’s problem, since there is
no α inducing firms and the worker to jointly implement first best decisions.
4.2 The market equilibrium
At the equilibrium both firms maximize their respective profits, the worker
maximizes his utility, and the capital market clears, i.e. K = k1+k2. Taking



















Comparing the above condition with the first best decision, we observe that
with α = 0 the allocation of capital between the two sectors is first best
whereas the worker does not invest in any human capital. At the other
extreme for α = 1 the worker’s decision is first best, but firm 2 does not invest
in capital (one could say that the capital allocation between the two sectors
is maximally inefficient). It is easily verified that between these two extreme
values, investments in human capital are increasing in α and converge toward
first best, whereas the allocation of physical capital worsens converging to
the maximally inefficient case.
This analysis contributes to understanding the effect of a parameter
change. On one side, an increase in φ means that human capital becomes
more important thereby raising the marginal benefit of an increase in α. In
the other side, an increase in λ means that the marginal return to capital in
sector 1 increases relative to that of sector 2. As a result, capital moves to
sector 1, thus, for any α reducing the demand for capital in sector 2. It also
means that the marginal costs of an increase in α, due to the misallocation
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of capital between the two sectors, is lower the larger λ. The intuition is
straightforward; increasing the share to labor raises the worker’s incentive to
invest in human capital. However, it simultaneously lowers the firm’s output
share thereby reducing its incentive to invest.?
4.3 Institutional design with an efficient political process
In this subsection, we work under the hypothesis that the political system
functions efficiently avoiding lobbying activities leading to capture by one of
the interested parties. As a result, we suppose that society allocates bargain-











Due to autarky framework, observe that in the above objective function, we
ignore rental payments to capital. Indeed, the market equilibrium condition
implies that r [K − k∗1(α)− k
∗
2(α)] = 0.
Proposition 1 The function w(α) is concave and has an interior solution
over the set α ∈ [0, 1].























We proceed in two steps. We first show that A(α) is decreasing concave
withA0(0) = 0 and, second, thatB(α) is increasing concave in α withB0(1) =
0. The definition of A(α) implies:
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Figure 1: Welfare in Autarky
In figure 1, we represent an example with the following parameter values;









. The proposition verifies that with all other allowed
parameter values, we would obtain a similar shaped welfare function. In the
example evaluating the first order condition at zero and solving for α yields
α∗ = 0.44. The figure shows how in a world burdened with holdup problems
the institutional setup may play a significant role in shaping production and
welfare. For parsimony, we introduced in the model a strong restriction by ig-
noring the complementarity between physical and human capital. Obviously,
adding such a complementarity would only enhance the marginal effects at
the extreme points α = 0 and α = 1 where either one or the other party
has the entire bargaining power. Thus again, we would obtain an interior
solution (even though without additional restrictions the objective function
may in fact not be concave).
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5 Competition of systems with no capture
In this section, we introduce a second country that is assumed perfectly
symmetrical to the first. Thus, we have two countries denoted by i = A,B.
Since we are only considering a static environment, we also assume that the
countries have the same initial capital stock. Regarding mobility, we assume
that capital is perfectly mobile while labor is perfectly immobile. Obviously,
this is an extreme requirement, particularly in light of the increased labor
migrations observed in the last decades, especially in the European context.
Nevertheless, we introduce the assumption to capture the idea that it is more
costly for labor than capital to move to across countries because of language,
religion and other social barriers. We initially assume that the political
system is free from capture in order to fully focus on the impact of introducing
a competition of systems in an environment characterized by trade. The
competition of systems should be understood as a non-cooperative contest
in the legal and institutional design underlying labor relations. Specifically,
the countries are assumed to set their αA, i = A,B simultaneously in a non-
cooperative fashion to maximize their respective objective functions resulting
from the political process.
5.1 The market equilibrium with trade
In the context of our model, the countries can only trade physical capital
against the consumption good. Taking the institutional setup as given, i.e.
for a given αA and αB, competition in the capital market leads to an alloca-
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The first two equations simply state that in each country, the investors’
marginal product of capital must be equalized across the two sectors. Observe
that we dropped the rental rate of capital which obviously equalizes the




, j = 1, 2). The third equation
requires the rental rate of capital to be equalized across countries. Finally,
the last equality reflects capital market clearing. Given that labor is not
mobile, workers’ decisions with respect to their investments in human capital
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are unaffected by the possibility of trade, and solely determined by the local
institutional framework.
Using the capital market clearing condition and noting that the third
equation in the above system implies kA1 = k
B
1 , we find that the equation
system reduces to a two by two system. Solving for the capital market




































A symmetrical result obtains for country B.
5.2 Institutional design with systems competition
In this section, we consider the following scenario. We assume that initially
each country lived in autarky. Thus, its institutional setup obtains from the
analysis in 4.3 and yields αi = α∗. We then remove the barrier to trade
and assume that the countries compete with one another in the institutional
design. As a result, the countries play a prisoners’ dilemma game to de-
termine the respective αi. Just as in the autarky case, we assume that the
political process of each country is efficient, maximizing the overall welfare of
their respective constituencies. At that stage each country maximizes its own
welfare taking the institutional environment of the other country as given.


























Two remarks are in order. First, note that gk(kA1 (α
A,αB)) stands for the
rental rate of capital determined through the market equilibrium with trade.
Second, unlike in the case of autarky market equilibrium does not imply that
K−kA1 −k
A
2 = 0 since a country may either become a net importer or exporter
of capital. The latter point is of particular importance. It means that the
institutional designer will be aware that they (and the competing country)
can adjust the institutional framework to affect the capital allocation.
Proposition 2 (αA,αB) = (α∗,α∗) is not a Nash equilibrium for the game
with no capture and with systems competition.
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Proof. To prove the claim, we simply show that WαA(α∗,α∗) < 0. Sub-






































The last two terms, which capture the effect of the institutional framework
on human capital, are the same as in the autarky case. We know from the
proof of proposition 1 that B(αA) is increasing. To verify the claim, all we































































































































The argument follows the typical prisoners’ dilemma logic. Supposing
that country B were to keep its institutional framework as in autarky, i.e.
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set αB = α∗, country A would find it advantageous to reduce the bargaining
power of its own labor. The heuristic is as follows; holding kA1 + k
A
2 = K
country A would face the same costs and benefits as in autarky. However in
addition it is able to attract capital from countryB. Ignoring the latter effect,
we know from the autarky result that at (αA,αB) = (α∗,α∗) all the other
marginal effects must add up to zero. However, since attracting additional
capital obviously raises overall welfare, it becomes advantageous for country
A to adjust its institutional framework to attract capital. To do so the









Figure 2: Institutional competition with no capture
Figure 2 provides a geometrical representation of the foregoing result for
the same parameters as figure 1. The solid curve yields the welfare function
in autarky. The dashed curve yields country A’s welfare function under the
assumption that αB = α∗. By reducing the bargaining power of labor, the
country would reduce its investments in human capital and raise the interest
rate. The latter would attract capital and improve the allocation of capital
across the two sectors.
Of course, in a prisoners’ dilemma game, the dashed curve is only a
fleeting illusion. Due to the perfect symmetry between the countries, B has
a the exact same incentive to reduce its bargaining power. Intuitively, we
would expect from the foregoing that the Nash equilibrium resulting from
systems competition leads to less bargaining power. It is easily verified that
the intuition is correct if we limit attention to symmetric equilibria.
Proposition 3 Let α∗∗ denote a symmetric Nash equilibrium for the case of
no capture and under systems competition, then α∗∗ < α∗.
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Proof. At the symmetric Nash equilibrium, we have
Cα(α
∗∗,α∗∗) +Bα(α∗∗) = 0
=⇒ Aα(α
∗∗) +Bα(α∗∗) > 0
The economic interpretation is that as each country tries to attract capi-
tal, it will reduces α. Consequently, at the equilibrium level, the bargaining
power of labor reduces to α∗∗ < α∗. In the case of the parameters used in the
foregoing figures the optimal α characterizing the institutional setup drops










Figure 3: Welfare loss with system competition
Thus, the model predicts that under systems competition between two
countries that have an efficient political system free from capture, the insti-
tutional design of the labor market would suffer; overall welfare would be
reduced and, more especially, the immobile factor would be losing. The cen-
tral argument leading to the result is reminiscent of the logic described by
Sinn (2003). If institutions underlying the labor market have been designed
to maximize welfare and counter some of the weaknesses of the perfectly com-
petitive system than the failures that originally caused the government to take
action .... show up again at the higher level of government competition.
The result suggests that if countries, with a well functioning political
system, decide to switch from an autarkic environment to a free trade situ-
ation, they might be better off negotiating to find the cooperative solution.
Thus, instead of a competition of systems, this tends to favor a politically
16
negotiated “harmonization” approach.14 In our model, it would mean that
the countries agree to implement α∗.15 Of course, the conclusion has been
derived under the assumption that the political system performs well enough
to avoid capture by either of the interested parties. In the remaining, we
consider the polar case.
6 Capture by labor
In this section, we consider one of two possible cases; the situation where
labor representatives dominate the political process at the institutional de-
sign stage. Specifically, we assume that through lobbying, strikes or other
activities of unions, the institutional design maximizes the rent obtained by
labor in sector 2. Contemporary economic history shows periods of capture
by capital as well as by labor. As discussed in the introduction, the sym-
metric case where the institutional design stage has been captured by capital
could also be analyzed. However, in our model systems competition could
not possibly introduce any beneficial effect since its impact, if any, would
be be to further increase the bargaining power of firms. Slightly adjusting
the model, for example by distinguishing between unskilled and skilled labor,
and introducing mobility in the latter case, would add a countervailing effect
reinserting the beneficial impact of systems competition. The coexistence
of three factors (capital, skilled labor and unskilled labor) creates technical
complications, but the underlying intuition should be the same.
6.1 Autarky
In our framework, the workers receive the share α of the appropriable quasi-
rent in sector 2. In addition, they incur the cost of investment in human
capital. Given the foregoing assumption, the institutional setup is designed
to maximize the resulting utility













´γ + (1− δ) δ δ1−δφ 11−δα 11−δ (15)
14A final conclusion would require, however, to model the negotiation game between
countries. Intuitively though, assuming a Rubinstein type bargaining one would expect
the efficient solution to emerge.
15Note that embedding the foregoing game in a repeated framework would most likely
not yield α∗ because politicians are short-lived. As in the foregoing footnote, a complete
analysis would require to model the political process between the two countries.
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It is easily seen that this function is not necessarily concave because the
second term is increasing convex in α throughout. Nevertheless, maximizing
u with respect to α yields an interior solution. To see this, observe that






















´γ+1 + δ δ1−δφ 11−δα δ1−δ , (16)
we find uα(0) > 0 and uα(1) = −∞. Figure 4 yields the shape of u(α) for
the parameter values used in the foregoing sections. Defining with α∗L labor’s
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Figure 4: Labor’s utility in the case fo capture
As one would intuitively expect, we observe that labor finds it optimal
to expand its bargaining power compared to the welfare maximizing α∗. To-
gether with figure 1, we see that in our numerical example capture by labor
in the autarky framework implies a reduction in the overall welfare of about
10%.
6.2 Systems competition with capture
We conclude by examining the impact of institutional competition. To do
so, we again focus on the case of perfectly identical countries.
We assume that in both countries labor has captured the institutional
design. We denote by U(αA,αB) the objective function of the labor repre-
sentative in country A. Using the market allocation of capital in the case
18
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Figure 5: Systems competition with capture by labor
The full line is u(α). The dotted line is the objective function U(αA,α∗L).
Just as in the case with no capture, the prisoners’ dilemma suggests to the
decision maker that he can do better than α∗L by reducing the bargaining
power of labor and attracting capital into the country. But obviously, in
equilibrium this is not possible. At the Nash equilibrium, both countries have
lowered their bargaining power. In the numerical example, it UαA(α∗∗L ,α
∗∗
L ) =
0 yields α∗∗L = 0.63 < 0.69 = α
∗
L. However, the competition, which seems
undesirable from the point of view of the decision maker, turns out to be
a blessing from the point of view of society as a whole. Specifically in the
numerical example it allows welfare to increase by 5%.
7 Conclusion
This paper studies the effects of systems competition when the regulator may
use institutional design for two different purposes: to reduce the inefficien-
cies of organizations and to attract some of the mobile factors. We show that
the two objectives are not well aligned. In particular, due to the prisoners’
dilemma the countries cannot succeed in attracting the mobile factor. In
this context, the situation of the political process is of first importance. If
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the political process is efficient, systems competition undermine the institu-
tional design. In contrast, with a capture by rent seekers — especially by the
immobile factor — we find that systems competition could improve economic
efficiency.
In our model, we assume incomplete contracts introducing two separate
holdup problems. The legal and institutional design allocates bargaining
power in order to balance the ensuing inefficiencies. Increasing the bar-
gaining power of labor is useful because it guarantees that labor will have
an incentive to invest in human capital. On the other hand, it reduces the
firm’s incentive to invest in physical capital. While our choice to exploit these
holdup problems was useful, it is not the only way to create a link between
economic efficiency and the legal and institutional design. For instance, one
could analyze a situation as in Bental and Demougin (2006) substituting
for the holdup in human capital a moral hazard problem thereby affecting
the trade-offs. More generally, any of the theories justifying the existence of
firms based on market failures should also introduce a possibility of a legal
and institutional design problem.
We conjecture that all these design problems would lead to similar results.
Thus, altogether, we concur with Sinn (2003) that systems competition is
costly provided that the hand of the state is benevolent. At the other extreme
however, when the state is better described as a grabbing hand, systems
competition may provide a powerful disciplining device, thereby forcing the
underlying political decision mechanism to increase welfare. Whether the
hand of the states is best described as benevolent or grabbing is an empirical
issue, going beyond the scope of this paper.
In addition, our paper suggests a mitigated interpretation of empirical
results concerning the comparison of legal and institutional systems in terms
of economic performance. A suggestive, yet potentially misleading, interpre-
tation would be that countries which have the best economic results should
be copied. However, in our analysis this conclusion is obviously erroneous.
For instance, considering the numerical example for the case of a well func-
tioning political system, assume the following situation; country A keeps its
legal and institutional environment as in autarky, i.e. α = 0.44, while coun-
try B plays the non-cooperative strategy α = 0.35. As a result, country A
would become a net exporter of capital, loosing almost 10% of its capital base
(440.5) while, on the other hand, country B would increase its capital by the
same quantity. Altogether, the capital labor ratio in the B economy would
dwarf that of country A by 20%. With respect to welfare, country B would
outperform country A by significant amount (WA = 83.7 < 90.2 = WB).16
16Similar results hold for output with Y A = 87 and Y B = 92.
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Despite these numbers, we should not conclude that country B is doing the
right thing. Indeed, if country A were to imitate country B the overall econ-
omy would converge to the suboptimal Nash equilibrium presented in the
paper (i.e. WA = WB = 86.2). In contrast, if country B were to imitate
country A the overall welfare would be raised (WA =WB = 88.5).
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